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In contradiction with Kerckhoﬀs' principle [?], private
algorithms are still used.
Creating a strong new cryptosystem from scratch is not easy.
These algorithms respect some properties identical to
algorithm which has gained one's spurs.
When the goal of an attacker is to retrieve information on a
private algorithm, his attack is termed reverse engineering.
Pseudo DES with customized s-boxes.
Even if an algorithm is securely designed, it may be vulnerable
to physical attacks as fault injection attacks.
The fault injection attacks consist in disrupting the circuit
behaviour.
FIRE Fault Injection for Reverse Engineering.
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DES Data Encrytption Standard
Established by the NIST [?]
A symmetric cryptosystem, speciﬁcally a 16-round
Feistel cipher.
Starts by IP, a permutation of 64 bits and ﬁnishes by
its inverse IP−1.
The round function F on 32 bits consists in 4 steps.
Expansion E which maps 32 bits in 48 bits
by duplicating half of the bits.
⊕ with the 48 bits of round key Kj ,
j ∈ [[1, 16]].
8 S-boxes Si : boolean functions 6→ 4
Permutation P of 32 bits.
FIRE DES Le Bouder 09/26/13 5/1
S-boxes
S-boxes Si , i ∈ [[1, 8]] substitute a 6-bits input mi for a 4-bits
output yi .
Si (mi ) = yi
S-boxes are represented with a table of 4 lines and 16 columns.
Let mi be one input, the ﬁrst and the last bit establish the line
number. The bits in the middle establish the column number.
To sum up mi deﬁnes the position in the s-box of a cell and yi
deﬁnes the value in the same cell.
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First FIRE attack [?]
A single bit fault occurs in R15.
C and C∗ are known thus L16, R16, L16∗ and R16∗ can be
obtained with IP.
m = E(R15)⊕ K16 = E(L16)⊕ K16
m∗ = E(R15∗)⊕ K16 = E(L16∗)⊕ K16
L15 is unknown, the s-boxes outputs y and y∗ cannot be
retrieved.
y = P−1(R16⊕ L15)
y∗ = P−1(R16∗ ⊕ L15)
∆y = y ⊕ y∗ = P−1(R16⊕ R16∗ ⊕ L15⊕ L15) =
P−1(R16⊕ R16∗)
Si (mi )⊕ Si (m∗i ) = ∆yi
S-boxes are deﬁned up to a translation.
They ﬁnish with an exhaustive search.
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The Attack Path
A single-bit fault is injected in R14.
The fault is more propagated than in R15,
i.e. more bits in the s-boxes inputs of the last
round are faulted.
In R15 two s-boxes can have faulty inputs i.e
1 or 2 diﬀerent impacted s-boxes.
In R14 all s-boxes can have faulty inputs i.e
1,2,3,4,5,6,7 or 8 diﬀerent impacted s-boxes.
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Propagation of the faulty bits
1 E can multiply the numbers of bits by 2.
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Propagation of the faulty bits
1 E can multiply the numbers of bits by 2.
2 After S-boxes of round 15, the numbers of
faulty bits can be equal at 8.
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Propagation of the faulty bits
1 E can multiply the numbers of bits by 2.
2 After S-boxes of round 15, the numbers of
faulty bits can be equal at 8.
3 Finally thank to the E in round 16, the
numbers of faulty bits can be equal at 16.
4 The permutation P dispatches the faulty bits
and the 8 s-boxes can have faulty inputs.
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Inputs are known
As in [?] R16, L16, R16∗ and L16∗ are
known.
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Inputs are known
As in [?] R16, L16, R16∗ and L16∗ are
known.
⇒ Thus the inputs of s-boxes m and m∗ are
known.
FIRE DES Le Bouder 09/26/13 15/1
Diﬀerential outputs are unknown
As in [?] R16, L16, R16∗ and L16∗ are
known.
⇒ the inputs of s-boxes m and m∗ are known.
R14∗ = L15∗ 6= L15.
⇒ ∆y = P−1(R16⊕ R16∗ ⊕ L15⊕ L15∗) is
unknown.
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We can known the diﬀerential at the outputs
s-boxes in round 15.
Finally we have only two possible fault values
in R14∗.
This uncertainty in taken in account in ∆y .
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S-box properties
We can consider two properties of s-boxes justiﬁed by Brickell
in [?].
1 Changing 1 input bit of an s-box results in changing at least 2
output bits.
2 Each line of an s-box is a permutation of the integers 0 to 15.
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Results
Statistics about the number of faults necessary to succeed
an attack (estimated from 1000 attacks)
statistic without with
tool P1 and P2 P1 and P2
mean 423.07 234.76
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Results
Exhaustive search
The results are for 100 attacks with diﬀerent numbers of faults
Number Average of number Median of maximal Maximum number
of faults of s-boxes which number of guesses of guesses
are retrieved to deﬁne s-boxes to totaly
up to a translation up to a translation deﬁne s-boxes
120 0.04 4.549 · 1042 2174
140 0.89 9.5105 · 1014 282
160 2.76 62208 247
180 4.53 16 236
200 6.06 8 235
220 6.93 4 233
240 7, 5 0 232
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Thank you for your attention
Do you have any questions ?
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